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ndxer Research

The Outlook outage, beyond the inbox.

The November 12 disruption put Outlook in the spotlight. Mail records show how far its routes extend, from millions of domains to roughly half of .gov and .edu.

Recorded MX targets under outlook.com
12.38%

5.28 million of 42.63 million domains (estimates)

See how the share varies

When Microsoft 365 services were disrupted on November 12, nearly 130,000 Outlook problem reports appeared on Downdetector shortly after 1 p.m. Eastern, the Associated Press reported. Microsoft reported trouble accessing Exchange Online mailboxes in the Americas.[1] The disruption reached apps that connect to Microsoft 365, too. Anthropic reported failures in its Microsoft 365 connector’s mail, calendar and search tools, as well as problems with Claude for Outlook.[2]

Outlook also has a footprint outside the inbox. An estimated 5.28 million domains named an outlook.com destination for incoming mail. The routes were especially common in .gov and .edu. In some institutional domains, Outlook shows up in a different place altogether, on the list of services authorized to send mail. These records describe connections to Outlook. They leave open which domains experienced the outage.

Updated . We recalculated this article using the same scope as Mail Insights: all recorded MX targets in the study, including targets named by subdomains. The figures were computed November 12 between 11:27 and 11:32 p.m. EST (November 13, 04:27 to 04:32 UTC). Live Insights figures can change as new records appear.

More than 5 million domains had Outlook routes

When someone sends mail to an address on a custom domain, a mail exchange record (MX) points to a destination for incoming delivery. Among an estimated 42,630,258 domains with recorded MX destinations, 5,275,635 (12.38%) had one in the outlook.com group. That’s about one in eight. The share was roughly four times as high in .gov and .edu.

Outlook in context: the largest MX groups

The 12 largest MX target groups

Estimated share of domains with recorded MX targets. Bar tracks run from 0% to 20%.

  • google.com5,655,109 domains13.27%
  • outlook.com5,275,635 domains12.38%
  • secureserver.net1,589,999 domains3.73%
  • googlemail.com1,104,631 domains2.59%
  • ovh.net937,840 domains2.20%
  • hostinger.com928,916 domains2.18%
  • rzone.de762,204 domains1.79%
  • ionos.de710,594 domains1.67%
  • hostedemail.com450,453 domains1.06%
  • one.com423,961 domains0.99%
  • registrar-servers.com423,638 domains0.99%
  • cloudflare.net410,584 domains0.96%

About 31.7 million domains (roughly three in four) had no recorded MX target in the outlook.com, google.com or googlemail.com groups.

Domains can appear in more than one target group. These are mail destinations, which can include forwarding and security gateways.

Google Workspace uses Google mail routes to deliver messages to Gmail inboxes on an organization’s own domain.[6] In the MX rankings, google.com and googlemail.com are separate groups. The same domain can name both. Counting each domain once, their combined estimate is 5,657,445.

Across outlook.com and the two Google groups, the estimate is 10,913,369 domains (25.60%). The remainder includes other hosted mail destinations, domains’ own mail servers, and security gateways. It measures how much of the recorded MX evidence falls outside those three groups.

About half of .gov and .edu had Outlook routes

In .gov, an estimated 3,065 of 6,004 domains had an outlook.com target (51.05%), about 4.1 times the study-wide share. The .edu share was 49.29% and .bank reached 42.77%. In the U.K.’s .ac.uk and Australia’s .gov.au namespaces, the shares were 54.85% and 55.02%.

outlook.com across institutional namespaces

View data table
NamespaceEligible domainsoutlook.com domainsShare
.gov.br10,0006696.69%
.edu.au7,0543,09243.83%
.gov6,0043,06551.05%
.edu5,4472,68549.29%
.gov.uk3,9181,45837.21%
.aero2,97991930.85%
.ac.uk1,76396754.85%
.gov.au1,63489955.02%
.edu.br1,23927722.36%
.bank80934642.77%
.nhs.uk41714234.05%
.gc.ca19114274.35%
.mil5300.00%

Each suffix describes a defined group of domain names. One organization can use several domains, and organizations can use names outside the suffix most closely associated with their sector.

Outlook’s share varies sharply by suffix

The outlook.com group appeared on 35.20% of eligible .au domains and 0.161% of eligible .ru domains. The share for .au is about 218 times as high. Among .cn domains the share was 1.21%.

Compare two suffixes

Compare two country-code suffixes

View data table
NamespaceEligible domainsoutlook.com domainsShare
.au572,117201,40635.20%
.ru878,8131,4180.161%
.cn124,9041,5111.21%
.us88,63915,14117.08%
.cu43810.228%
.kp200.00%
Browse all country-code suffixes

Explore country-code suffixes

View data table
NamespaceEligible domainsoutlook.com domainsShare
.ac1,63717210.51%
.ad68917024.67%
.ae30,5586,44021.07%
.af911525.71%
.ag2,38775431.59%
.ai66,87711,02116.48%
.al6,17667510.93%
.am7,2563785.21%
.ao2,16550023.09%
.aq24312.50%
.ar126,1315,2854.19%
.as2,08987041.65%
.at293,85552,68017.93%
.au572,117201,40635.20%
.aw1314836.64%
.ax76919725.62%
.az8,7337388.45%
.ba11,3359718.57%
.bb1895227.51%
.bd6,9723244.65%
.be324,79971,62922.05%
.bf468285.98%
.bg28,9191,2924.47%
.bh62424439.10%
.bi483387.87%
.bj5187213.90%
.bm75034546.00%
.bn2687026.12%
.bo2,71829911.00%
.br596,50248,1318.07%
.bs1232419.51%
.bt445224.94%
.bw1,13325022.07%
.by40,5861550.382%
.bz2,98338612.94%
.ca422,037108,23625.65%
.cc38,2281,8454.83%
.cd676466.80%
.cf23841.68%
.cg24083.33%
.ch458,61669,19815.09%
.ci1,86224813.32%
.ck1032726.21%
.cl97,3218,1648.39%
.cm1,326624.68%
.cn124,9041,5111.21%
.co199,85925,92012.97%
.cr2,57379030.70%
.cu43810.228%
.cv8169511.64%
.cw2088641.35%
.cx1,300977.46%
.cy4,6021,45631.64%
.cz392,65927,6307.04%
.de3,189,580289,9859.09%
.dj3203210.00%
.dk353,76454,73515.47%
.dm11565.22%
.do5,4121,26123.30%
.dz2,737742.70%
.ec10,2111,50814.77%
.ee48,8154,3628.94%
.eg2,33845919.63%
.er100.00%
.es328,95423,0917.02%
.et7728511.01%
.eu387,81532,2998.33%
.fi151,74234,08322.46%
.fj48214029.05%
.fk40820.00%
.fm3,4182687.84%
.fo1,64660636.82%
.fr948,05777,7828.20%
.ga345195.51%
.gd2693412.64%
.ge12,1487446.12%
.gf48510.42%
.gg5,34757510.75%
.gh1,48861741.47%
.gi39317845.29%
.gl85823427.27%
.gm2333615.45%
.gn802936.25%
.gp2605721.92%
.gq7545.33%
.gr158,11611,4877.26%
.gs489336.75%
.gt4,00371717.91%
.gu6116.67%
.gw6258.06%
.gy4075112.53%
.hk29,4393,82212.98%
.hm3600.00%
.hn95126728.08%
.hr47,4145,32811.24%
.ht281227.83%
.hu222,90113,1425.90%
.id98,3233,1373.19%
.ie71,17815,67822.03%
.il72,60013,05417.98%
.im3,25538311.77%
.in270,76915,8425.85%
.io117,09214,11412.05%
.iq99712612.64%
.ir86,848310.036%
.is16,7494,59127.41%
.it784,17749,8626.36%
.je96835536.67%
.jm41313432.45%
.jo1,26442633.70%
.jp820,35426,3223.21%
.ke16,4141,2257.46%
.kg3,353732.18%
.kh1,04522321.34%
.ki811012.35%
.km29517.24%
.kn611931.15%
.kp200.00%
.kr114,7052,5702.24%
.kw85031637.18%
.ky96538339.69%
.kz34,3418732.54%
.la3,77554514.44%
.lb97433234.09%
.lc23893.78%
.li5,91177913.18%
.lk9,4549449.99%
.lr1181714.41%
.ls3565014.04%
.lt66,9695,4438.13%
.lu16,6414,02824.21%
.lv29,4462,7459.32%
.ly2,7792177.81%
.ma14,9831,1477.66%
.mc92124526.60%
.md10,1993963.88%
.me80,6424,6405.75%
.mg1,035696.67%
.mh3133.33%
.mk9,1586036.58%
.ml460296.30%
.mm81124530.21%
.mn4,24976718.05%
.mo6777711.37%
.mp7534.00%
.mq1062523.58%
.mr3357823.28%
.ms1,00415415.34%
.mt2,8741,15840.29%
.mu1,96665733.42%
.mv96837438.64%
.mw4478418.79%
.mx108,33211,40410.53%
.my44,2803,9018.81%
.mz1,66024314.64%
.na1,33641330.91%
.nc1,71561135.63%
.ne135128.89%
.nf3326.06%
.ng17,1366783.96%
.ni63014322.70%
.nl1,024,706198,94319.41%
.no140,16539,96828.51%
.np11,4677506.54%
.nr1600.00%
.nu28,9034,08214.12%
.nz120,69139,46032.70%
.om1,10430627.72%
.pa1,53542427.62%
.pe24,2713,22013.27%
.pf45614331.36%
.pg56317330.73%
.ph15,7341,94912.39%
.pk24,3868693.56%
.pl664,66023,0703.47%
.pm673304.46%
.pn30516.67%
.pr1924523.44%
.ps1,76630617.33%
.pt94,50914,14014.96%
.pw2,224251.12%
.py6,01480413.37%
.qa2,56677130.05%
.re5,9364858.17%
.ro185,5347,6584.13%
.rs44,1782,0854.72%
.ru878,8131,4180.161%
.rw1,170958.12%
.sa12,6523,50527.70%
.sb1754726.86%
.sc57710217.68%
.sd41992.15%
.se375,41365,47217.44%
.sg35,2286,23417.70%
.sh2,9421414.79%
.si52,1165,70210.94%
.sk128,0966,7195.25%
.sl271238.49%
.sm4344710.83%
.sn1,53719812.88%
.so2,455732.97%
.sr5197714.84%
.ss871213.79%
.st10,314790.766%
.su16,373330.202%
.sv1,46831121.19%
.sx2552911.37%
.sy49210.203%
.sz3128928.53%
.tc4646614.22%
.td8789.20%
.tf35392.55%
.tg500306.00%
.th24,2302,72511.25%
.tj1,444241.66%
.tk1,181181.52%
.tl274248.76%
.tm52691.71%
.tn7,1284015.63%
.to3,7371323.53%
.tr127,7969,9327.77%
.tt47910121.09%
.tv32,6023,1359.62%
.tw65,5123,7495.72%
.tz5,7704738.20%
.ua87,1921,9852.28%
.ug2,41726911.13%
.uk1,278,857269,80721.10%
.us88,63915,14117.08%
.uy13,3999336.96%
.uz12,1612291.88%
.va8011.25%
.vc4,13956013.53%
.ve3,2331935.97%
.vg2243415.18%
.vi842125.00%
.vn88,7226,7117.56%
.vu2076531.40%
.wf14532.07%
.ws38,2633650.954%
.ye193136.74%
.yt357318.68%
.za186,55130,12816.15%
.zm1,01441440.83%
.zw4,62363913.82%

A country-code suffix describes a domain name. It leaves open where an organization operates or where its mail is used. Small groups need particular care: .cu had 1 match among 438 eligible domains, while .kp had 0 matches among 2.

Outlook can appear on the sending side, too

Some domains direct incoming mail to a security gateway such as Proofpoint or Mimecast. A gateway can filter messages before passing them on to a mailbox service.[7] A Sender Policy Framework (SPF) record describes which services may send mail on behalf of the domain.[4]

Recorded gateway MX and Outlook SPF

View data table
GatewayEligible domainsDirect SPF includesShare
Either gateway2,1641,16053.60%
Proofpoint1,33871353.29%
Mimecast82944954.16%

Among institutional domains with a recorded Proofpoint or Mimecast MX target and no recorded outlook.com MX target, 1,160 of 2,164 (53.60%) had a direct Outlook SPF include. The combined count includes each domain once across both gateway groups.

Microsoft can appear in SPF even when a gateway appears in MX. That authorization describes permitted senders. The record leaves open whether Microsoft actually sends mail for the domain or hosts its inboxes.

What the outage brought into view

On November 12, the disruption showed up in inboxes and in tools connected to Microsoft 365. The mail records show another part of Outlook’s reach. Millions of domains list it for incoming delivery, and some that route incoming mail through a security gateway authorize it to send. Both links matter when tracing how a domain’s email works.

Data & definitions

What the study measures

The figures use the same recorded MX scope as Mail Insights. The denominator is the estimated number of distinct registrable domains with at least one recorded MX target that can be assigned to a target group. The scope includes MX records on subdomains. Null mail targets and wildcard artifacts are excluded.

Mail Insights groups destinations under a base name such as outlook.com or google.com. In this article “Outlook-linked” refers to the outlook.com group. Other Microsoft target groups fall outside this count. MX group counts are estimates of distinct domains. A domain can appear in several groups, and independently estimated totals may not add up exactly. Each domain carries equal weight regardless of its mailboxes or message volume.

MX evidence shows a route was recorded. The date labels when these aggregates were computed. The findings leave open which routes were active during the November 12 outage and how many domains or people were affected.

The gateway comparison uses the same MX scope for the institutional namespaces shown above. It takes domains with a recorded Proofpoint or Mimecast MX target and no recorded outlook.com MX target. The SPF count requires a direct include of spf.protection.outlook.com in a recorded SPF value at the registrable domain. Gateway counts are exact within this recorded scope. A domain can appear under both gateways. The MX and SPF records can come from different dates; these figures do not establish that both were in use together.

Group totals, percentages and study definitions. No individual domain names or raw records.

Sources

  1. Associated Press coverage of the November 12 outage
  2. Anthropic incident report for the Microsoft 365 connector
  3. Microsoft documentation for commercial Microsoft 365 endpoints
  4. Microsoft documentation for mail routing and SPF records
  5. Microsoft documentation for Microsoft 365 operated by 21Vianet
  6. Google Workspace documentation for Gmail mail routing
  7. Proofpoint documentation for its Microsoft 365 mail gateway integration